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STICKY COMPLIANCE:
AN ENDOWMENT ACCOUNT OF EXPRESSIVE LAW
David E. DePianto*
Abstract
This Article extends the literature on expressive law by developing a
model of compliance rooted in the endowment effect. The central premise
of the model is that compliance with legal rules, while costly from an ex
ante perspective, may also endow individuals with a stream of benefits
whose ex post value will increase. Examples of compliance-related
benefits would include reductions in risk to one’s own health and safety,
enhanced reputation (as a law-abiding individual), and even tangible
goods. Under this novel account, once an individual has complied with a
law, received some associated benefits, and grown attached to such
benefits via the endowment effect, violating the law might thereafter
entail a net economic loss—even without the sanction that induced
compliance in the first place. While the initial threat of sanction plays a
key role in this story, the law’s capacity to change individual
endowments through forced compliance, and in turn alter preferences, is
the expressive engine of the endowment model. The upshot is not only
that the compliance decision is about more than just costs, narrowly
conceived; it is that the very act of compliance at one time might change
the entire cost structure for future decisions about compliance. The
Article distinguishes the endowment model from other expressive
accounts and offers a series of antismoking examples as suggestive
evidence of the model in action.
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INTRODUCTION
Economic accounts of compliance revolve largely, if not exclusively, around
the threat of formal sanctions. Rational actors deciding whether to follow a law
purportedly act as “amoral calculators,” 1 weighing the relevant costs and benefits
and, ultimately, choosing their actions so as to maximize payoffs. 2 From this
perspective, legal sanctions merely determine the price of noncompliance, tilting
the decisional calculus away from bad behavior and toward more desirable patterns
of activity. 3 Remove the threat of formal sanction, the rational-actor model predicts,
and compliance will abruptly and inevitably fade. In short, rational compliance
with laws—like any other activity viewed through the lens of classical
economics—is an instrumental means to a utility-maximizing end.
Unsatisfied with this narrow conception of human motivation and armed with
a series of intriguing counterexamples, several commentators have sought to
describe the “expressive” dimension of law. As used in this literature, the
expressive power of law (or simply, “expressive law”) refers to the capacity of
legal rules to influence behavior in ways unrelated to the direct and continued
1

Neil A. Gunningham et al., Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in
Environmental Protection, 27 LAW & POL’Y 289, 289 (2005) (quoting Robert A. Kagan &
John T. Scholz, The Criminology of the Corporation and Regulatory Enforcement Styles, in
ENFORCING REGULATION 67, 67 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984)).
2
See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L.
REV. 339, 339 (2000) (arguing that law exerts an influence on behavior, independent of the
effect of its sanctions).
3
See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 3 (6th ed. 2012)
(“[T]o economists, sanctions look like prices . . . .”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE 75 (1981) (“The basic function of law in an economic . . . perspective is to alter
incentives.”). See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968) (analyzing the costs and benefits of deterring
harmful activity using law); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (describing law’s effects on social
“norms” or regularities).
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threat of formal sanctions. 4 Prior explanations of expressive law have appealed to
the ability of legal rules to signal commonly held values, 5 law’s capacity to
coordinate behavior, 6 the moral authority of laws perceived as legitimate, 7 the
ability of legal rules to change individual beliefs about the consequences of certain
activities, 8 and the influence of law on the social meaning of certain behaviors.9 By
refining—and in some cases directly challenging—rational-choice accounts of
compliance, expressive models have shed light on the often complex relationship
between law and its subjects. In doing so, this area of scholarship has also yielded
practical information about enforcement strategies and the resources required to
achieve legal compliance under various conditions.
This Article extends the literature on expressive law by developing a model of
compliance rooted in the endowment effect. 10 Simply put, the endowment effect is
the systematic tendency of individuals to place higher values than they otherwise
would on goods that they happen to own at the time of valuation. 11 Put another
way, “[t]he least amount of money that owners of goods are willing to accept to
part with their possessions is often far greater than the amount that purchasers
would be willing to pay to obtain them.” 12 Taken as a whole, research on the
endowment effect suggests that this psychological phenomenon—or something
quite similar 13—applies across a wide variety of goods: from tangible goods, such

4

See, e.g., Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 35, 57–63 (2002) (describing how law can change beliefs about consequences);
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 949–62
(1995) (describing the “social meaning” theory of expressive law); McAdams, supra note
2, at 341–72; Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1649, 1713–28 (2000) (applying expressive law theory to smoking bans and landlord
liability law); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2025–29 (1996).
5
See McAdams, supra note 2, at 340.
6
See McAdams, supra note 4, at 1651.
7
See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (2006) (arguing that if
people “regard legal authorities as more legitimate, they are less likely to break any laws”).
8
See Geisinger, supra note 4, at 57–63.
9
See Lessig, supra note 4, at 949–62.
10
As discussed further in Part II, the compliance dynamic developed herein does not,
strictly speaking, rely on the endowment effect. Rather, it relies on the exchange anomalies
that the endowment effect purportedly explains.
11
See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1227 (2003) (demonstrating how the endowment effect “can be incorporated
into legal policy analysis across a variety of substantive areas”).
12
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 31, 31 (2011).
13
Recent experimental work has raised serious questions about whether ownership
itself—as opposed to the various circumstances surrounding ownership—drives changes in
preference (or, as I call them, “exchange anomalies”). I address the implications of this line
of research for the endowment model in Part II, explaining why the model may capture
something important about compliance even if the endowment effect, narrowly construed,
does not exist. See generally Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory:
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as coffee mugs and chocolates, 14 to intangible goods that aren’t owned in any
conventional sense, like entitlements to clean air 15 and default contract terms. 16
Of what relevance is the endowment effect to expressive law? The central
premise of the model presented here is that compliance with legal rules, while
costly from an ex ante perspective, may also endow individuals with a stream of
benefits whose ex post value will increase. Benefits of compliance may include
reductions in risk to one’s own health and safety, an enhanced reputation, access to
new markets and social circles, and even tangible goods. 17 Under the endowment
account, once an individual has complied with a law, received some associated
benefits, and grown attached to such benefits via the endowment effect, violating
the law might thereafter entail a net economic loss—even without the sanction that
induced compliance in the first place. For example, a bar owner may reluctantly
comply with an antismoking ordinance only to find the value of a smoke-free
environment increase above its ex ante (precompliance) value. If the increase in
the value of the smoke-free environment is substantial enough, formal sanctions
might prove unnecessary in the long run.
While the initial threat of sanction plays a key role in the above story, the
“stickiness” or path-dependent 18 nature of compliance is a result of rearranged
endowment sets. The law’s capacity to change individual endowments through
forced compliance, and in turn alter preferences through the endowment effect, is
the expressive engine of the endowment model. The upshot is not only that the
compliance decision is about more than just costs, narrowly conceived; it is that
the very act of compliance at one time might change the entire cost structure for
future decisions about compliance. To invoke a commonly used metaphor, the
initial use of the proverbial “stick” can, in certain circumstances, yield “carrots”
that induce continued compliance over the long run.

Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2013) (discussing
experimental and behavioral economics in legal scholarship).
14
Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference
Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277, 1278–81 (1989).
15
See Robert D. Rowe et al., An Experiment on the Economic Value of Visibility, 7 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 9 (1980).
16
See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The
Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587–92
(1998) [hereinafter Inertia and Preference]; Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and
Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 630–33 (1998) [hereinafter The Status
Quo Bias].
17
See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care
Owed to Others? Law and Economics in Conflict, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 19, 28–29 (2000)
(discussing the relationship between reasonable care and risk to one’s own safety).
18
On the nature of path dependence, see Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path
Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000)
(characterizing path dependence as a dynamic in which “preceding steps in a particular
direction induce further movement in the same direction” and one in which “the relative
benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time”
(emphasis omitted)).
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Importantly, the compliance dynamic described above could also be framed as
a story about norm internalization. In the literature on law and social norms,
internalization refers to the process whereby individuals assimilate a belief or
pattern of activity into their life such that any deviation from the activity becomes
a net economic “bad.” 19 Compliance with a noninternalized norm or law is
therefore costly, and compliance must be induced through external sanctions.
Compliance with a norm or legal rule that has been internalized, on the other hand,
yields a net benefit even without external inducement. Because the process of
internalization and the expressive power of law lead to a common result—
compliance without enforcement—the endowment model can explain both
phenomena by reference to postcompliance changes in endowments and
preferences.
To date, the endowment effect has garnered a significant amount of attention
in discussions of law and policy. 20 However, the focus has been exclusively on the
challenges that it poses to the Coase Theorem and related economic attempts to
allocate legal entitlements by reference to individual preferences. 21 For example,
the endowment effect has been invoked to explain why those granted legal (or
quasi-legal) entitlements in the form of trial rights, 22 IP rights, 23 or environmental
goods 24 are often reluctant to trade them away through Coasian bargaining. 25 Little
attention, however, has been paid to the related question of why “losers” in the
entitlement game—those not granted a particular legal entitlement—might
ultimately follow a disfavored legal rule absent a continued threat of
enforcement. 26 By linking the literature on expressive law and internalization to
the endowment effect, this Article fills that important gap.
19

See Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression,
Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000) (noting the lower net costs of
obeying a social norm).
20
See infra Part II.A.3.
21
See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L.
REV. 1051 (2000) (arguing that law and economics should look beyond rational choice
theory and, instead, should focus on “law and behavioral science”).
22
See Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology
and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 220 (2007).
23
See, e.g., Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 32–36; Christine Jolls & Cass
R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 220–21 (2006).
24
See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 217, 236–37 (1993).
25
Coasian bargaining is the process through which actors buy and sell legal
entitlements in the shadow of the law. The Coase theorem posits that, in the absence of
transaction costs, property will be allocated to the highest-value user. See COOTER & ULEN,
supra note 3, at 81–95.
26
Professors Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen’s discussion of “addictive”
compliance comes closest to the endowment model presented herein, but it focuses
primarily on the avoidance and/or minimization of costs (rather than the role of
compliance-related benefits). More importantly, the article does not explicitly link the
endowment effect to expressive law or internalization. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note

332

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

The endowment model also departs from prior work on expressive law in at
least two important respects. First, unlike other accounts of internalization, the
endowment model emphasizes the benefits of compliance rather than just the costs.
Under many existing models, the possible benefits of compliance are simply
overlooked. Thus, compliance is about what the law takes away rather than what it
can offer. In other models, the costs and benefits associated with compliance are
viewed as conceptually indistinguishable aside from the mathematical sign (+ or –)
that precedes them. 27 Inasmuch as compliance-related benefits are subject to the
endowment effect, though, the cost-benefit distinction becomes important; there is
no longer one stable, time-invariant cost of compliance. As a result, costs and
benefits cannot be summed up in a simple way and compared across compliance
and noncompliance states of the world. Rather, the cost structure of compliance is
dependent on one’s endowments, which, in turn, may be a function of one’s
current compliance status.
Secondly, the endowment account suggests that certain expressive aspects of
law may be triggered only after compliance is externally induced through sanctions
(thus endowing compliers with the associated benefits). This distinguishes the
endowment model from other accounts, under which the mere passage of a law
would presumably trigger the relevant expressive mechanism. 28 This unique
feature of the endowment model doubles as a testable implication and may help
explain—in ways that other expressive models cannot—the timing of compliance
in certain situations. For example, antismoking ordinances in a number of states
and municipalities achieved remarkably high levels of compliance, but only after
the laws became officially enforceable (often long after the laws were officially
adopted). 29 The timing of compliance in these cases, combined with other factors
concerning preenforcement awareness of the smoking bans and their low long-term
enforcement levels, are strongly suggestive of the endowment model. More
specifically, the antismoking examples tell a story in which short-term compliance
is induced by the perceived threat of sanction, while long-term compliance is
induced by, among other things, a self-reinforcing change in preferences about
smoke-free environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part I provides
background on the study of compliance, starting with the classical economic
approach and moving to expressive law and the role of social norms. Part II begins
with a brief overview of the substantial research on the endowment effect,
21, at 1116–17 (“For example, fastening a seatbelt when driving might be a behavior that is
initially costly, as the driver must remember to fasten the belt and must suffer a loss of
comfort. As fastening the seatbelt becomes a habit, however, the costs of doing so decrease
greatly, and it is possible that the feeling of inconvenience is replaced by a feeling of
comfort and security as the behavior becomes habitual.” (emphasis added)).
27
See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 2, at 341–43 (developing an expressive model of
law in which the costs and benefits of compliance—though more than just formal
sanctions—are static across compliance states).
28
See, e.g., Geisinger, supra note 4, at 64 (“[T]he inferential process may lead us to
change the certainty of a belief based on the passage of law without new information.”).
29
For further discussion, see infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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discussing the range of situations in which it applies and the mechanisms
underlying its operation. The Part also addresses recent empirical work that raises
important questions about the meaning and scope of the endowment effect. Against
this backdrop, Part II goes on to present the endowment model of compliance—
how it works and where its effects would most likely manifest. In large part, the
section will seek to explain how compliance-related benefits function like the
iconic mugs in the endowment effect experiments. Given recent evidence calling
the endowment effect into question, Part II also discusses why the endowment
model may still be valid even if the endowment effect, strictly speaking, is not.
Part III will locate the endowment model in the wider literature on social
norms and expressive law, discussing how the model differs from other expressive
accounts and why it is uniquely suited to capture certain compliance dynamics.
Though this Article will not endeavor to empirically test the endowment model, a
series of antismoking examples from around the country are offered as suggestive
evidence of the model at work.
I. EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF COMPLIANCE
A. Rational Choice—Compliance Through an Economic Lens
The economic conception of compliance has long dominated academic
discourse on the subject. 30 The persistence of this approach—referred to, variously,
as rational choice theory or the standard deterrence model—is at least partially
attributable to its simplicity. 31 Rational actors, after all, are predictable, easy to
model, and in certain social domains, possess significant predictive power. 32 In this
sense, homo economicus is to the study of law what frictionless planes are to the
study of physics: a flawed, but often useful, starting point.
Despite its predictive successes, though, the rational actor model is ill
equipped to explain why individuals obey laws that are not enforced (or enforced
only to a trivial extent) through formal sanctions. Why, for example, do people
refrain from littering, pick up after their dogs, 33 and heed antismoking signs 34
when formal sanctions are unlikely? What explains the high level of compliance
30

See generally Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: SelfControl and Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903 (1998);
Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 157 (2000). On the general influence of economic reasoning in the legal academy, see
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A
Quantitative Study, 36 J.L. & ECON. 385 (1993).
31
See Etzioni, supra note 30, at 160.
32
See generally Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) (responding to behavioral economists’ charges that
rational choice theory erroneously “assum[es] that people are rational”).
33
See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 595
(1998).
34
See id; Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance
Without Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 69, 72 (Robert
L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).
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with underenforced environmental regulations 35 and seat-belt laws? 36 Why don’t
people cheat more often on their taxes? 37
The inability of economic models to fully capture such scenarios arises from
the standard assumptions of rationality and the “legal centralist” tendencies that
have historically defined the economic approach. Under the rationality
assumptions, individual preferences are complete, stable, exogenous, informed,
and narrowly self-serving. 38 Legal centralism, further, is the “belief that governments are the chief sources of rules and enforcement efforts.” 39 Taken together,
these assumptions substantially limit the universe of factors that a rational actor
can consider when facing a compliance decision.
To illustrate, suppose an economically rational individual is deciding whether
to follow a law or violate its strictures and absorb the relevant penalty. If the cost
of compliance were $100 and the expected sanction $50—say, a 50% chance of a
$100 fine—a rational actor would choose to violate. If the cost of compliance were
under $50 or the expected penalty above $100 (holding the other numbers the
same), the actor would choose to comply. As this simple example illustrates, the
costs of violation are all known to the rational actor and narrowly construed,
consisting solely of the formal sanction discounted by the likelihood of detection.
Other noninstrumental considerations, such as the effect of compliance on others
or the moral dimension of the law, fall outside the purview of the classical model.
In addition to being narrowly construed, the costs and benefits of compliance
are also assumed to be static in the economic model. That is, rational actors are
precluded from changing preferences to improve their situation within a given
economic landscape. This result flows from the “stability” and “exogeneity”
assumptions. The former, as its name suggests, holds that preferences remain more
or less fixed over time. 40 The latter holds that individual preferences are a function
of the inherent qualities of goods rather than their distribution in the world at any
particular time. 41 For example, one may prefer apples to bananas, but the fact that
one possesses either one at any given time should not, according to classical
economic thinking, affect this preference.
35

See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 308–09 (2004).
36
See Maggie Wittlin, Buckling Under Pressure: An Empirical Test of the Expressive
Effects of Law, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 419, 456 (2011).
37
See, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under HighPenalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 681 (2012).
38
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 21, at 1061–66.
39
See Etzioni, supra note 30, at 159 (quoting ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 138 (1991)).
40
See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1998) (“Conventional law and economics assumes
that people exhibit rational choice: that people are self-interested utility maximizers with
stable preferences and the capacity to optimally accumulate and assess information.”).
41
See, e.g., Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra note 16, at 611 (“[S]ome buyers
might prefer the delivery of goods on Tuesdays and others on Wednesdays, but whether
lawmakers determine that the default delivery day for contracts is to be Tuesdays or
Wednesdays will not affect which day any individual buyer would prefer.”).
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With respect to compliance decisions, these rationality assumptions suggest
that the adoption of a law will not change how a person values the entitlements at
stake. For example, one may or may not value a clean park enough to pick up after
one’s dog or refrain from littering, but the law’s stance on this issue—whether it
gives the entitlement to a clean park or establishes a “littering is okay” norm—
should not affect preferences. 42 Rather, all the law can do is change the costs
associated with violation, so as to discourage the activity in question. Therefore, an
individual predisposed to violate a norm will do so unless some external set of
incentives, namely civil liability or criminal punishment, steers her away from that
course of action and toward a less costly one.
In the language used by social-norms scholars, the above story means that
homo economicus is incapable of internalization. Rather, homo economicus knows
what he 43 wants, knows all the costs and benefits relevant to the compliance
decision, makes the determination in a social vacuum, and is not likely to change
his mind absent external pressures. Unsurprisingly, efforts to explain the process of
internalization within the strict parameters of rational choice have proven
difficult. 44
42

See Korobkin, supra note 11, at 1228.
Some commentators have suggested that the economic conception of rationality
reflects values and interests that are culturally coded as masculine. See Julie A. Nelson,
Feminism and Economics, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 131–35 (1995).
44
Professor Robert Cooter, among the first law and economics scholars to lament the
inability of homo economicus to undergo meaningful change, has noted the following:
43

Theories of endogenous preferences, which go back at least to Adam Smith,
have not flourished in economics. Microeconomics marginalizes morality by
treating it as an exogenous taste or a side constraint upon optimizing behavior.
Thus the theory of cooperative games, which requires normative commitments
from players, languishes while the theory of non-cooperative games flourishes.
Cooter, supra note 30, at 911 (citations omitted). To remedy this imbalance, Cooter has
proposed a theory of “Pareto Self-Improvement” to explain internalization in something
that resembles a rational-choice framework. Id. at 904–05. Under the theory of Pareto SelfImprovement, actors alter their character (or preference function) in order to increase the
opportunities, and corresponding economic rewards, available to them. Id. at 922. Thus, a
person may internalize a social norm where the circumstances—including the social and
legal landscape—make it economically beneficial to do so. However, most of the intuitive
appeal of the concept of Pareto Self-Improvement arises through Cooter’s analytical
sleight-of-hand providing that “character is chosen.” Id.
Not surprisingly, other theorists have criticized this aspect of the Pareto SelfImprovement theory:
[T]he concept of self-motivated preference change within a framework of
rational choice theory is internally incoherent. A Pareto self-improvement, by
definition, is a self-motivated change in the individual’s discount rate. It
assumes that an individual can rationally choose to expand her opportunity set
by reducing her rate of time discounting and thus increasing the present value of
future interactions. But under rational choice theory, an actor who wants to be
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B. Expressive Accounts of Law and Compliance
In its broadest sense, the study of expressive law is an effort to inject social
and behavioral realism into the study of compliance. 45 Over the past two decades,
several overlapping models have emerged to make sense of behavior that would
otherwise be deemed irrational by economic models. Though expressive models,
as responses to the rational choice paradigm, are often framed as narrow efforts to
explain specific “high compliance/low enforcement” situations, their implications
extend beyond such examples to the study of compliance generally. The remainder
of this section outlines several expressive mechanisms through which law can
influence behavior.
1. Social Norms
Several accounts of expressive law use social norms to explain behavior that
appears irrational from an economic perspective. At the most general level, norms
might be described as regularities in the way people understand and react to social
situations. Scholars have divided the universe of norms into a number of
categories, including conventions (such as driving on a certain side of the road),
habits (like drinking coffee in the morning), descriptive norms (such as taking off
one’s hat when it is hot), and injunctive norms (such as not littering in public
spaces). 46 Injunctive norms, which have drawn the most scholarly attention in the
study of social norms, are thought to be more than accidental or convenient
behavioral patterns. Rather, injunctive norms are often viewed as having a moral
dimension—an “oughtness”—about them that leads many to feel guilt when they
motivated by a concern for future considerations is, in fact, motivated by a
concern for future considerations. In other words, someone who wants to be a
cooperator is [already] a cooperator.
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1603, 1636 (2000) (emphasis in original). Cooter acknowledges the deficiency of his
theory, noting that the process whereby “people who want to improve their character
succeed in doing so remains[, where economics is concerned,] murky.” Cooter, supra note
30, at 922. Though Cooter offers three noneconomic explanations of Pareto SelfImprovement based on the psychological insights of Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, and
Sigmund Freud, it is difficult to fit such theories into the language of classical economics.
See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1661–62
(1996).
45
This objective is shared by other legal subdisciplines, such as behavioral
economics, the insights of which can be found in many expressive theories.
46
See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 30, at 1656 (“Taking off your hat to escape the heat is
different from taking off your hat to satisfy an obligation. The former is a regularity and the
latter is a norm.”); Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing,
43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577, 598 (2006) (“Descriptive norms are how most people would
behave in comparable situations. Injunctive norms refer to the extent to which most people
would approve of the target behavior.”).
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fail to comply: 47 “[b]eyond affecting the content and intensity of numerous
particular predispositions, social norms help people form (and re-form) the self, by
profoundly influencing their identities, their worldviews, their views of
themselves, the projects they undertake, and thus the people they seek to
become.” 48
Of course, because social norms are costly to observe, some individuals will
remain predisposed to violate them absent some external motivating pressure.
Informal sanctions supply this pressure. Just as fines, civil liability, and criminal
punishment can induce compliance with legal rules, the threat of communal
sanctions can coerce individuals into complying with social norms. Examples of
such informal enforcement mechanisms are legion: people who choose not to vote
are subject to mild forms of harassment by their politically engaged friends,
smoking in certain contexts is met with scorn and confrontation, “litterbugs” are
chastised by passersby, 49 the reputations of businesspeople who behave unethically
or opportunistically are tarnished, 50 and motorists who drive unsafely or fail to
heed traffic signals are shamed by way of horn honking and unsavory hand
gestures. 51 As noted by Professor Cass R. Sunstein,
When defection [or, noncompliance,] violates norms, defectors
will probably feel shame, an important motivational force. The
community may enforce its norms through informal punishment, the
most extreme form of which is ostracism. But the most effective use of
norms is ex ante. The expectation of shame—a kind of social “tax,”
sometimes a very high one—is usually enough to produce compliance. 52
Thus, whatever specific form they take, informal sanctions can make compliance
with costly social norms economically rational.
Compliance with norms can also yield long-term rewards, or “cooperative
surpluses,” in the context of repeated interactions. 53 Professor Eric A. Posner’s
signaling model of social norms, for example, explains how adherence to social
norms might function as a sort of proxy for individual reliability. The primary
function of norms, in Posner’s model, is to fill informational gaps in what would
otherwise be very risky repeated games. In this signaling model, social norms are
able to distinguish “cooperators” from “defectors,” not through any of their

47

See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253, 1261 (1999).
48
Etzioni, supra note 30, at 163.
49
See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2030.
50
See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1763–64
(2001).
51
Personal experience.
52
Sunstein, supra note 4, at 2029–30.
53
See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 174 (2000).
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qualitative (or normative) attributes, but rather by dint of the economic cost
associated with compliance. 54
To be an effective signal under Posner’s theory, compliance needs to be costly
enough to signal long-term commitment to a potential partner. By observing costly
social norms, cooperators signal to the world that they are “in it for the long
haul”—or at least long enough for them to offset the short-term costs of
compliance with the longer-term cooperative surpluses. Conversely, defectors who
eschew social norms are viewed as myopic and untrustworthy. 55
For example, an employer might prefer to hire a college graduate to a high
school graduate even if college imparts no relevant skills or has no correlation with
intelligence or aptitude. Under Posner’s signaling theory, the mere fact that the
college graduate paid a substantial amount of money for their education implies
that they will be committed to the job long enough for them to offset the costs of
the education (the signal) with the surpluses, or wages, associated with the
position. 56
Whether compliance is induced by the threat of social alienation or the
promise of long-term cooperative surpluses, social norms are commonly viewed as
a pervasive and influential force in determining behavior. To the extent that laws
align with, establish, or enhance the operation of norms, therefore, compliance
with laws is not solely a function of formal enforcement (as the standard
deterrence model suggests). And, of course, laws do frequently align with
preexisting social norms. Though “special interests” certainly play a role in the
formulation of social policy, it remains the case that laws “formulated in ways that
are congruent with social norms are much more likely to be enacted than laws that
offend such norms.” 57 By the time a rule of conduct gets adopted as a formal law,
therefore, many will already have internalized its content.
Even where a legal rule is not initially backed by a universally accepted social
norm, the adoption of a law can tip behavior into an equilibrium of high
compliance. Assuming that some portion of a community has internalized the
content of a law or will comply reflexively—publicly upholding it and/or shaming
violators—others will account for this expected social cost and follow suit: “If
most citizens obey the law from respect, enacting the law without enforcing it can
probably achieve the desired result. . . . For the small recalcitrant group of
lawbreakers, rude remarks by citizens and other informal punishments deter
without state coercion.” 58 The process described above, importantly, is selfperpetuating. The more people who are observed complying with a given law, even
if compliance is reluctant and externally induced, the greater the perceived social
cost of noncompliance. The greater the perceived social cost of noncompliance, in
turn, the more people will find compliance to be individually advantageous. This

54

See id; Daniel Gilman, Of Fruitcakes and Patriot Games, 90 GEO. L.J. 2387, 2390–
94 (2002).
55
See POSNER, supra note 53, at 169–74; Gilman, supra note 54, at 2393–94.
56
See POSNER, supra note 53, at 180–82.
57
Etzioni, supra note 30, at 159.
58
Cooter, supra note 33, at 595.
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“network effect” 59 triggered by the passage of a law implies that even without
formal enforcement, a legal rule can rapidly transform a situation of zero
compliance into one of universal compliance. 60
Norms-based expressive accounts like the above, it should be noted, can be
seen as extensions of the rational-actor model rather than competing accounts.
Nothing about the compliance dynamic described above, in other words, is strictly
inconsistent with the view that individuals base compliance decisions on costs and
benefits. Social norms merely add a new type of cost (or benefit) to the equation.
2. Social-Meanings Accounts
Another set of expressive models emphasizes the role of law in establishing
and reinforcing social meanings. 61 By drafting, publicizing, or applying a legal rule
in a certain way, the government can attach widely shared associations—either
positive or negative—with certain activities. For example, “[i]f the nation suffers
under a health craze, the government can use ‘healthy styles of life’ as arguments
to fight drug usage.” 62
The social meanings attached to law can impact people individually or
collectively. In the former case, the change is internal—akin to the “acceptance of
a new reason” 63 —rather than an instrumental response to perceived social
pressures. A helmet law, for example, may change an individual’s view of riding a
motorcycle without head protection from an exercise of freedom and individualism
to an irresponsible act. 64 In the latter case, widespread changes in social meaning
can activate “norm cascades” in the manner described above: “[i]ndividuals . . .
cannot be expected to act against social meanings, even if the social meanings are,
from some perspective, stupid. The reason follows from what has been said so
far: Social meanings are part of the benefits and costs associated with any
individual action.” 65 Because social meanings are inextricably intertwined with
norms, moreover, the same dynamic of self-reinforcement applies equally to both
accounts.

59

A network effect describes a situation in which the value of an object or activity is a
function of the number of others who own the relevant good or participate in the activity.
60
See Cooter, supra note 33, at 595; McAdams, supra note 2, at 370–71.
61
See generally Lessig, supra note 4 (discussing the interplay of governance and
social construction); Sunstein, supra note 4 (writing on the expressive function of law).
62
Lessig, supra note 4, at 957.
63
See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1661–62
(1996).
64
See Lessig, supra note 4, at 964. This type of individual change is difficult to
square with strict rational-actor models.
65
Id. at 1000–01.
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3. Informational Accounts of Expressive Law
In addition to signaling majority views and influencing social meanings, legal
rules may also serve as a reliable source of a different kind of information: “[t]he
basic idea is that, through the process of information aggregation inherent in
legislative decision-making, the law can provide information about intrinsic
features of the world. This information causes citizens to update their prior beliefs
and thereby changes individual behavior . . . .” 66 Note the difference between this
“educational” function and the consensus-signaling function mentioned in the
discussion of social norms: the former supplies information about nonsocial facts
of the world—like the inherent riskiness of certain activities—while the latter
signals the reactions that others are likely to have in response to certain patterns of
conduct.
The law’s capacity to serve this informational function hinges on a number of
considerations. First, reliable information on the precise consequences of risky or
potentially harmful behavior must be scarce and expensive to acquire. Second,
governing bodies must be viewed as trustworthy sources of this type of
information. 67 For example, if legislators are viewed as an especially intelligent or
competent class of individuals, the empirical facts they accept as the basis for laws
might be viewed as reliable (or at least more reliable than competing folk
narratives circulated among the masses). Even if legislators are not viewed as an
especially smart group, the mere fact that they are a group might also make their
wisdom more dependable. 68 Both the deliberative nature of legislating and its
winner-take-all nature make it less likely that individual errors in reasoning will
taint the collective wisdom of legislating bodies. 69 Finally, the legislative process
gives governing bodies access to expert opinions and affords them the time and
resources to effectively interpret and digest complex sets of information.
For all of these reasons, law—or the empirical subtext associated with legal
rules—might lead people to update the substance of their beliefs or the certainty
with which they are held. Laws forbidding drunk driving or the ingestion of drugs,
for example, may signal unknown or counterintuitive facts about the risks posed by
such activities. As with the other of the expressive mechanisms, formal
enforcement is largely beside the point; legal rules educate rather than punish.

66

Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury Theorem
and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1,
2–3 (2003).
67
See Geisinger, supra note 4, at 59.
68
See Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 66, at 3 (“[E]ven if individual legislators
have no more information or expertise than individual citizens, the legislative process of
aggregating votes will provide citizens with superior information. If legislative expertise
did exist, it would only reinforce this basic argument.” (emphasis added)).
69
See Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 66, at 2–3.

2014]

FROM STICK TO CARROT

341

II. THE ENDOWMENT ACCOUNT OF INTERNALIZATION AND EXPRESSIVE LAW
The preceding section discussed various ways in which law can influence
behavior and garner widespread compliance in ways other than the direct threat of
sanction. This section adds to that effort. After providing some background on the
endowment effect and its extant legal applications, this section connects this
psychological effect to the literature on expressive law, showing how the law’s
ability to reshuffle endowment sets can induce long-term compliance without the
continued threat of sanction. This account, referred to as the endowment model, is
different than the accounts described above, but not necessarily incompatible with
them. That is, even in the limited circumstances where the endowment model most
likely applies, other aspects of expressive law may also apply simultaneously.
A. The Endowment Effect
As mentioned above, part of what it means to be economically rational is to
have exogenous preferences: preferences that derive from the inherent qualities of
goods rather than their distribution in the world at any particular time. In short,
whether you own something shouldn’t affect how much you like that something.
An individual may prefer to own either a house in the city or a house in
the country, but the location of the house that she presently owns should
not affect her preference or the intensity of that preference. Likewise, an
individual might prefer cheap gas and dirty air or expensive gas and
clean air, but his preference should not depend on whether gas is cheap
or expensive or whether the air is dirty or clean, nor should it depend on
which of these combinations the law favors.70
A growing body of empirical work, however, has challenged the notion that
preferences are entirely stable and unaffected by ownership. Much of this research
is built around a behavioral quirk referred to as the endowment effect.
The observable empirical results that underlie the endowment effect are
“exchange asymmetries” and “willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay” gaps (also
known as WTA-WTP gaps or offer-ask disparities). 71 The former label refers to
situations in which people display a systematic reluctance to trade goods that they
currently own with other goods of similar market value. The latter terms refer to
disparities between the amount of money that individuals are willing to accept to
endure a certain state of affairs or part with a good (WTA) and the amount of
money that people are willing to spend to obtain that same state of affairs or set of
goods (WTP). 72 The remainder of the Article refers to WTA-WTP gaps and
exchange asymmetries collectively as “exchange anomalies.”
70

Korobkin, supra note 11, at 1228.
See generally Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 7–8 (using empirical results to
disprove endowment theory).
72
See id.
71
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Though the endowment effect is often conflated with exchange anomalies, 73 it
is best understood as an explanation of such phenomena or a theory about the
underlying mechanisms. To say that the endowment effect operates in a given
context or applies to a certain set of goods, in other words, is to assert that
ownership simpliciter—merely being endowed with something—changes the value
of the owned goods, thereby generating WTA-WTP gaps and exchange
asymmetries. 74
1. Supporting Evidence
Contingent valuation (CV) studies provide some of the earliest evidence of
WTA-WTP gaps. In such studies, the values of nonmarket goods are elicited
through hypothetical questions. 75 CV questions vary the baseline state of affairs so
as to generate either WTA or WTP values. A WTA value, for example, could be
elicited from the question “how much money would you require in order to accept
a 1% decrease in air quality?” The corresponding WTP question might be “how
much would you pay to improve air quality by 1%?”
CV studies on natural resources and environmental goods have consistently
shown WTA/WTP ratios well above unity (that is, WTA/WTP ratios that are larger
than one). One such survey, for example, indicated a large disparity between
willingness of duck hunters to pay for wetlands preservation ($247) and their
willingness to accept money to forego the same preservation efforts ($1044). 76
Another CV study of elk hunters yielded similar results: the hunters in the study
were willing to pay an average of $54 to increase their elk sightings by a particular
amount, yet they would demand approximately three times the willingness-to-pay
figure ($142) to reduce their elk sightings by the same amount. 77 Similarly,
participants in a CV study about air quality were willing to pay $4.75 per month to
maintain seventy-five miles of air visibility but would require a payment of $24.47

73

See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 839
(2012) (“The endowment effect, sometimes dubbed the WTA-WTP disparity, refers to the
phenomenon that individuals tend to place higher value on objects and entitlements that
they already have, compared to objects and entitlements that they do not have.”).
74
See Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly
Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory, 97 AM. ECON.
REV. 1449, 1449 (2007) (“To say that an observed phenomenon demonstrates an
‘endowment effect’ does not simply denote that an asymmetry was observed; rather, use of
the label implies that a very special form of preferences causes the asymmetry.”).
75
See ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO
VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD 2 (1989); Korobkin, supra
note 11, at 1232.
76
JUDD HAMMACK & GARDNER MALLARD BROWN, JR., WATERFOWL AND
WETLANDS: TOWARD BIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26–27 (1974).
77
William D. Schultze et al., Valuing Environmental Commodities: Some Recent
Experiments, 57 LAND ECON. 151, 165–66 (1981).

2014]

FROM STICK TO CARROT

343

to give up the same. 78 Other studies, both within and without the environmental
context, echo these results. 79
CV studies, however, face an important limitation: the results are hypothetical
in the sense that participants in such studies do not actually buy, sell, or own the
goods that they are asked to value. 80 In response to this limitation, a wave of
experimental studies sought to test for the presence of exchange anomalies in cases
where the stakes were real (i.e., where actual sales, purchases, and/or exchanges
were made). One influential experimental study randomly split the participants into
two groups, one of which received a coffee mug and the other a candy bar of
roughly equivalent market value. 81 When allowed to trade the goods—a mug for a
candy bar or vice versa—few in either group chose to do so. Since the reluctance
to trade appeared on both sides of the “market” and the initial assignments were
random, either the fact of ownership or something closely linked with ownership
appeared to be driving the results. 82
Other experimental studies have sought to create a miniature market for goods
such as pens and mugs by randomly distributing one of those items to half of the
study participants and giving the other half nothing. Those who received the good
in question were asked to state a price at which they would sell, and those who
received nothing were asked to reveal their buying price. 83 From this information,
the experimenters determined a market price for the good. “Sellers” who indicated
a price at or below the market price were required to sell the good, and “buyers”
who indicated a price at or above the market price would be required to buy the
good (thus limiting strategic bidding). In the end, far fewer trades were executed
than would be expected if ownership had no effect on the valuations given by the
participants. 84 To date, experiments of this type number in the hundreds. 85 Unlike
the exchange or barter-based studies mentioned above, the studies that create
functioning minimarkets yield information about the magnitude of the WTA-WTP
gaps.
WTA-WTP gaps and exchange asymmetries have been found across a wide
variety of goods: environmental entitlements like clean air and visibility; tangible
78

Rowe et al., supra note 15, at 10.
See generally Jack L. Knetsch, Environmental Policy Implications of Disparities
Between Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded Measures of Values, 18 J. ENV.
ECON. & MGMT. 227 (1990) (using economic and environmental assessments in controlled
tests to show that willingness-to-pay and compensation-demanded valuations are not
necessarily equivalent).
80
See Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 14–15; Korobkin, supra note 11, at 1232.
81
See Knetsch, supra note 14, at 1278.
82
See id.
83
See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329–33 (1990).
84
Id.
85
See generally John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP
Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2002) (examining forty-five studies comprising
208 experiments); Serdar Sayman & Ayse Öncüler, Effects of Study Design Characteristics
on the WTA-WTP Disparity: A Meta-Analytical Framework, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 289
(examining thirty-nine studies comprising 164 experiments).
79
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goods such as chocolates, pens, and mugs; and a strange collection of other items,
including lottery tickets, health and safety risks, nuclear waste, foul-tasting liquids,
and pathogen-contaminated sandwiches. 86 The size of the WTA-WTP gaps
observed in the literature, however, appears to vary widely. One recent metaanalysis of over forty studies, for example, found WTA/WTP ratios ranging from
0.74 to 113—meaning that, in some cases, individuals valued goods over one
hundred times more when they owned them than when they didn’t. 87 The median
and mean ratios in that survey were 2.16 and 7.17, respectively. 88 A similar survey
of 164 experimental results also found substantial variation in WTA/WTP gaps,
reporting a median ratio of 2.9, a mean of 7.1, and a maximum value of over one
hundred. 89
Aside from indicating the general range of WTA-WTP magnitudes, metaanalyses also provide clues about what determines the size of the gaps. For
example, WTA-WTP gaps appear to be largest where the good in question lacks a
close market substitute. 90 Thus, normal tangible goods like mugs and pens carry
lower valuation gaps. 91 Conversely, unique goods for which there are few
substitutes—such as environmental goods, health, and safety—often exhibit higher
gaps. 92 The more uncertain the value of the good, the more ownership seems to
impact its valuation.
The circumstances under which a good is received also affect offer-ask
disparities. Goods that are earned (or are perceived by their owners as having been
earned) are valued more highly than goods that are received through random or
accidental processes. 93 Also, WTA-WTP gaps are highest when the person
performing the valuation is doing so on behalf of themselves (i.e., not as an agent
for another). 94
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See Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 85, at 427.
See id.
88
See id.
89
See Sayman & Öncüler, supra note 85, at 300.
90
See, e.g., Wiktor L. Adamowicz et al., Experiments on the Difference Between
Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept, 69 LAND ECON. 416, 417 (1993) (hockey
tickets for a televised game led to a smaller WTA-WTP gap than hockey tickets for an
untelevised game); Jason F. Shogren et al., Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and
Willingness to Accept, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 255, 259–64 (1994) (an ordinary candy bar
carries no WTA-WTP, while food screened for pathogens shows a high valuation gap).
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See Shogren et al., supra note 90, at 264–66.
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See Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 85, at 433–35; Sayman & Öncüler, supra
note 85, at 296–98.
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See Korobkin, supra note 11, at 1236; George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff,
Source Dependence in the Valuation of Objects, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 157, 165–
66 (1994).
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See Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency
Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14–22 (2002).
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2. Alternative Explanations and Skeptical Voices
The apparent upshot of the above studies is that ownership or something
closely associated with ownership changes the way individuals assign value to
goods. Strictly speaking, the endowment effect is a narrow explanation of
exchange anomalies under which ownership itself—rather than the various
circumstances surrounding ownership—drives preference changes. In this sense,
the endowment effect is a species of the more general phenomenon of “loss
aversion”:
[W]hen deciding what to do, people give possible losses more weight
than potential gains of the same magnitude. Endowment theory is an
application of prospect theory, adding the hypothesis that ownership
determines whether one experiences a change as a gain or a loss.
Endowment theory posits that ownership sets one’s reference point, the
movement from which triggers either a perceived gain or loss, and that
people perceive the transfer or sale of endowments as losses. 95
However, there are other possible explanations for exchange anomalies that are
distinct from the “mere ownership” explanation implicit in endowment theory. 96
Some explanations, for example, attribute exchange anomalies not to
ownership or entitlement itself, but to things often associated with ownership, such
as increased knowledge about an object that only ownership could convey. 97
Exchange anomalies may also be attributable to affective features of ownership,
such as sentimental attachment to goods or the “felt need to remove some spheres
of life from the marketplace.” 98 Further, strategic bargaining behavior—in
particular, “buy-low/sell-high” approaches to market transactions—may also
explain offer-ask disparities. In the latter case, WTA and WTP values are not
really sincere valuations of goods, but rather attempts to achieve favorable
outcomes in the context of trades. 99
To varying extents, such explanations have been challenged on empirical and
theoretical grounds. 100 For example, if increased knowledge about objects drives
exchange anomalies, why do the exchange anomalies appear so quickly before any
95

Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 4.
To reinforce the point that the term “endowment effect” is a conclusory term about
the mechanisms underlying exchange anomalies—rather than the anomalies themselves—
Klass and Zeiler use the term “endowment theory” to refer to the notion that ownership
itself drives value gaps. See id.
97
See id. at 26; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1150–51 (1986).
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Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 26.
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See, e.g., id.; Korobkin, supra note 11, at 1243; Peter Knez et al., Individual
Rationality, Market Rationality, and Value Estimation, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 397, 397–98
(1985).
100
See Korobkin, supra note 11, at 1243–47 (discussing experimental research that
undermines alternative explanations of exchange anomalies).
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detailed knowledge about the object could be acquired? Further, why do exchange
anomalies arise with objects, like mugs, whose characteristics are already well
known? 101
Experimental procedures are another plausible explanation of exchange
anomalies. A recent line of empirical studies suggests that exchange anomalies can
be “turned on and off” through manipulations in study design. 102 For example,
experiments in which study participants are educated about the (potentially
confusing) trading mechanisms used in the experiments, afforded the opportunity
to practice trading, and ensured that their trades are anonymous, have failed to
generate WTA-WTP gaps. 103 Further, in bartering experiments, exchange
asymmetries are absent where the participants are told that their endowments are
randomly generated, the actions of the experimenters do not suggest anything
about the value of the goods, and the trading choices of the experimental subjects
are shielded from public view. 104 These “no-gap” experimental findings, though
somewhat controversial themselves, 105 constitute powerful evidence against the
notion that ownership alone changes preferences—that the endowment effect
exists as such. Accordingly, such studies serve as a cautionary reminder against the
uncritical acceptance and application of the endowment effect.
Despite its name, however, the endowment account of expressive law does
not hinge crucially on the existence of a narrowly construed endowment effect. 106
Nothing about the model described below, that is, relies on the view that
ownership simpliciter changes individual preferences. This Article assumes only
that the endowment effect or something closely resembling it could plausibly
101

See id. at 1251–52 (“[A]ttachment [to a good] seems a far less plausible
explanation of the endowment effect in experiments in which subjects are asked to
value consumer items just moments after they are randomly given the items.”).
102
Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept
Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for
Eliciting Valuations: Reply, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1012, 1012 (2011) [hereinafter Reply];
see also Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept
Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for
Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 542–44 (2005) [hereinafter Willingness to
Pay].
103
See Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 33–38; Plott & Zeiler, Willingness to Pay,
supra note 102, at 541.
104
See Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 33–38, 40.
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See Andrea Isoni et al., The Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the
“Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting
Valuations: Comment, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991–95 (2011).
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The model is named after the endowment effect because (1) though controversial,
the existence of the endowment effect is still a matter of active debate and (2) for better or
worse, the term “endowment effect” is used loosely in legal literature to refer to the notion
(or possibility) that legal entitlements can affect preferences. It is not my comparative
advantage to conclude either way on the status of this technical debate. Given the above
disclaimer, however, the “endowment model of expressive law” could just as easily be
called the “exchange anomaly account of expressive law” or the “trade asymmetry model
of expressive law.”
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operate to change the preferences of individuals. More specifically, it assumes that
either entitlement to a good, or some closely related set of phenomena that have, in
fact, generated exchange anomalies in the experimental context, might serve as a
trigger for preference change across compliance states. After all, it is the exchange
anomalies themselves—the differences between ex ante and ex post valuations of
compliance benefits—that drive the path-dependent compliance dynamic. And
nobody denies the existence of exchange anomalies themselves; it is their
interpretation that is controversial. This Article returns to this issue in greater detail
below, where specific types of compliance-related benefits are discussed.
3. Current Legal Applications
Notwithstanding its somewhat controversial nature, the endowment effect has
been thoroughly embraced by the legal academy. 107 Several commentators have
noted how the effect might serve to undermine the Coase Theorem, and costbenefit analysis more generally, by setting up a self-fulfilling story about economic
efficiency. According to the Coase Theorem, legal entitlements will ultimately
flow to those who value them most, thus achieving efficiency when parties can
effectively and cheaply bargain over them. 108 A corollary of the Coase Theorem is
that the initial assignment of legal entitlements should not matter from an
efficiency perspective. 109 For example, if a legal rule effectively grants firms the
right to pollute or impose some other type of harmful externality on third parties,
the affected third parties can organize and pay the firms not to pollute. Whoever
values the entitlement the most ultimately receives it.
However, if law plays a role in determining the preferences of the interested
parties, as it would in cases where the endowment effect is at play, the choice of
law cannot be justified by reference to individual preferences. 110
[A] robust offer-ask disparity greatly decreases our confidence in the
efficiency of private markets generally . . . . It also decreases our
confidence in the Coase Theorem as a mechanism for predicting the
consequences of private bargaining over legal entitlements. Even more
fundamentally, it constrains the policymaker’s ability to use measures of
value based on either observed willingness to pay or observed
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See, e.g., Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 18 (“A search of Westlaw’s Journals
and Law Reviews database finds 264 articles citing Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler’s 1990
piece, 88 citing Tversky and Kahneman’s 1991 article, and 63 citing Knetsch’s 1989
article. . . . Westlaw reports almost 1200 articles using the term [‘endowment effect’]
between 1990 and today.”).
108
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 3, at 81–84.
109
See id.
110
See Sunstein, supra note 97, at 1139 (“When preferences are traceable to a legal
rule or an existing legal regime, the rules and the regime cannot be justified, without
circularity, by reference to the preferences.”).
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willingness to accept. Rather, value must be determined by means other
than the observation of preferences. 111
Therefore, the endowment effect complicates the notion that the ex ante
preferences are an effective guide to policy.
Applying this line of reasoning, empirically minded legal scholars have
explored and tested the apparent implications of the endowment effect in several
legal domains. In the employment context, for example, the endowment effect has
been viewed as a justification for higher damages in improper termination cases
than in failure-to-hire cases. The idea is that a worker who is already endowed with
a job will value it more than someone who never had it. 112 Another extensive line
of research examines the implications of the endowment effect in the law of
contracts. Default contract rules, for example, operate under the assumption that
they can be undone according to the preferences of the contracting parties.
However, in light of the endowment effect, “when lawmakers anoint a contract
term the default, the substantive preferences of contracting parties shift—that term
becomes more desirable, and other competing terms becoming less desirable.” 113
This “stickiness” associated with default contract terms undermines the economic
notion that the preferences of contracting parties are independent of the law and, in
turn, renders the choice of default rules far more weighty than it would otherwise
be. 114
In the realm of intellectual property, the endowment effect has been invoked
in support of “liability” or “damage rules” rather than property rights. The reliance
on strong property rules in IP is premised on the notion that individuals are better
equipped than governmental actors (such as courts and agencies) to set prices for
their own work. 115 However, to the extent that the endowment effect operates on
intellectual property—and is enhanced when IP rights are enforced by strong
property rules rather than liability rules—granting individuals the right to set prices
may result in fewer licenses. Because creators of IP are seldom the best parties to

111

Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 4, 58 (1994).
112
See Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How the New Economics Can Improve
Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can Survive the Demise of the
“Rational Actor”, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 229 (2009) (“Firings cause endowment
loss, but failures to hire cannot (because an individual cannot come to feel an ‘endowment’
in a job she never had).”).
113
Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra note 16, at 611.
114
See id. at 623 (“If the selection of a default term can cause parties’ preferences for
substantive contract provisions to shift, the question of which possible default rule is
optimal takes on an additional dimension of complexity: lawmakers must anticipate the
effect of such preference shifts on the bargaining dynamics between the contracting parties
as well as the effects of transaction costs and strategic behavior.”); Russell Korobkin,
Inertia and Preference, supra note 16, at 1584–86; Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default
Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106, 109–11, 123 (2002); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of
Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1760–61 (1997).
115
See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 12, at 32–34.
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disseminate the fruits of their creativity, strong IP rights may therefore stifle the
diffusion of intellectual property—one of the chief aims of IP laws. 116
The above studies are only the tip of the iceberg; legal applications of the
endowment effect have covered a wide and sundry collection of entitlements.117
However, little attention has been paid to the potential impact of the endowment
effect on compliance decisions. Put another way, the extant legal literature on the
endowment effect has focused primarily on the way that law can influence
preferences through direct entitlements. The model presented below explores how
the endowment effect, or something closely resembling it, might ultimately
influence the preferences of those who are not directly granted a legal
entitlement—individuals, in other words, who face legal rules that appear costly
and undesirable from an ex ante perspective.
B. The Endowment Account of Expressive Law
1. Compliance-Related Benefits and Path Dependence
The central insight of the endowment model is relatively uncontroversial but
seldom discussed: compliance with social norms and legal rules, while costly in
one sense, can also open the door to a wide array of benefits. As used here, the
term “benefits” means more than the mere avoidance of formal or informal
sanctions. Rather, compliance-related benefits are the tangible, reputational,
interpersonal, or other endowments that flow directly from compliance with legal
rules. For example, legal rules concerning health and safety often lead to
reductions in risk to those who comply. Speed limits and seat belt requirements are
prime examples, as is the generalized tort principle that calls for reasonable care in
everyday activities. 118 Though such rules are typically framed as efforts to reduce
harmful externalities to third parties, compliance in many cases also would endow
the complier with an increased level of safety (or, equivalently, a decreased level
of risk to self). 119
In some cases, compliance with legal rules results in benefits of a more
tangible nature. A clean street, for example, would accompany a legal rule against
littering. Compliance with an antismoking ordinance would endow compliers with
the health and hygiene benefits of a smoke-free work environment. In other
instances, compliance can serve to create and alter relationships. Making a safer or
“greener” product in accordance with a law or regulation, for example, can
enhance the reputation of businesspeople and open up markets that previously
were closed. 120
116

See id. at 45.
See Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 23–25 (noting the “dizzying array of
entitlements that can be expected to trigger the endowment effect”).
118
See, e.g., Cooter & Porat, supra note 17, at 24–26 (discussing how reasonable
precaution decreases risk not only to others, but also to oneself).
119
See id.
120
See Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, Equilibrium and Welfare in a Model of Torts
with Industry Reputation Effects, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 265, 275–76 (2013); Michael L.
117
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Further, compliance with some rules can funnel individuals into otherwise
inaccessible social milieus. This interpersonal side effect of compliance is evident
in norms of nondiscrimination. Businesses that comply with employment
discrimination laws, for example, expose workers to a level of diversity that
otherwise might not have been obtained. As this example shows, compliancerelated benefits need not be directly related to the primary purpose of the
underlying law. The primary purpose of Title VII, as commonly interpreted, is not
to yield diversity benefits to third parties, but rather to remove discriminatory
barriers for historically disadvantaged groups. 121 Nonetheless, those who comply
with workplace discrimination laws would stand to reap the associated diversity
benefits. 122
To the extent that any of the compliance-related benefits outlined above are
subject to the endowment effect, compliance would have a “sticky” or pathdependent quality. Under the endowment account of expressive law, compliance is
initially induced by the threat of external sanctions, whether formal or informal.
Over time, however, parties forced to observe a particular legal rule will grow
more attached to the various benefits flowing from compliance. If the increase in
the valuation of compliance-related benefits is significant enough, parties
disinclined to comply with a law, ex ante, may continue to comply even in the
absence of continued sanctions. Over time, a legal sanction that initially coerces
people into compliance may therefore become superfluous.
The payoff schedule reflected in Table 1 illustrates the basic logic of the
model. Suppose an individual is deciding whether to comply with a law over
successive periods of time. For concreteness, assume that the law is a speed
regulation for drivers. In this case, the cost of compliance would be the extra
commuting time associated with slower speeds. The benefits of compliance (aside
from the lower risk imposed on third parties) would be decreased risk of injury to
the complier herself.

Barnett & Andrew J. Hoffman, Beyond Corporate Reputation: Managing Reputational
Interdependence, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 1, 5 (2008); Juan José Ganuza et al., Product
Liability Versus Reputation 1 (Nov. 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1986237.
121
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 10–11 (2005).
122
See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 77–79 (2000).
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TABLE 1: NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION OF ENDOWMENT MODEL
Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

5

5

5

1

1

1

4

4

4

4

6

6

I. Violate Law
(no sanction;
baseline payoff = 5)
II. Violate Law
(baseline payoff = 5;
expected sanction = 4)
III. Comply with Law (ex ante
view)
(baseline payoff = 5;
compliance costs = 1)
IV. Comply with Law (ex post
perspective)
(baseline payoff = 5;
cost of compliance = 1;
compliance benefits = 2)

(value of
compliance
benefits
increases
due to
endowment
effect)

Absent any threat of sanction, our hypothetical individual would prefer to
violate the rule, which would yield a baseline payoff of five in each time period (as
reflected in row I). Importantly, the individual would make the same choice—not
to comply—in every period if the individual were never forced by external
pressures to comply.
Rows II to IV introduce a sanction into the story. Row II shows the stream of
payoffs associated with violation of the speed law when the expected sanction is
four. Rows III and IV show the expected payoffs of compliance from different
perspectives: row III represents the expected stream of compliance payoffs from
the actor’s ex ante perspective, and row IV captures the payoffs associated with
compliance as the endowment effect takes effect and increases the value of the
decreased risk of injury. In both rows, the direct cost of compliance is one. If the
actor is never forced to comply with the law, the actor will always choose to
violate, as the comparison between rows I and III illustrates.
However, if initially forced to comply via the threat of sanction, the individual
would remain compliant from period two forward even if the legal sanctions were
lifted. Compliance becomes sticky in this case because the “inflated” values
associated with compliance are greater than the “uninflated” values of
noncompliance after period one. This is essentially an exchange anomaly: after
adhering to the law, compliers are endowed with a decreased risk of injury and
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thereafter value it more. The result is illustrated by comparing the payoffs of row
IV with those in row I starting in period two. The numbers in the above diagram—
specifically, the increasing differential between the payoff streams represented in
rows I and IV over time—represent the expressive effects of the endowment
model. After the first period, the increase in the individual’s valuation of the
compliance benefits crowds out the savings associated with noncompliance,
making compliance the superior long-run strategy.
2. Connecting Compliance to Exchange Anomalies and the Endowment Effect
Compliance with laws, of course, does not directly endow people with mugs,
chocolates, or pens. If compliance were induced in this manner—through the
dangling of these types of “carrots” rather than the brandishing of “sticks”—the
relationship between the endowment effect and compliance would be easy to
explain: once you comply and earn a mug, you may thereafter value the mug more
and continue complying, irrespective of external sanctions. Given that the law does
not operate this way, though, the following questions arise: First, what features of
compliance-related benefits make them like the coffee mugs (or other goods) that
have been linked to the endowment effect? Second, aside from the inherent
qualities of compliance-related benefits, what other features of “real world”
compliance situations bear a resemblance to the experimental conditions that yield
exchange anomalies?
(a) Are Compliance Benefits Like the Iconic Mugs in the Experiments?
The wide and diverse array of goods featured in exchange experiments helps
answer the first question posed above. For example, WTA-WTP gaps have been
observed in experiments where the good or entitlement in question is a risk to
one’s own health or safety 123—precisely the type of benefit that would redound to
individuals who comply with speed limits, seat-belt laws, or other laws governing
unsafe behavior. Thus, where compliance with a law endows someone with a
lower risk of harm (or an increase in personal safety), compliers might plausibly
value their safety more ex post than they would have in a noncompliance state.
Environmental goods such as air quality, visibility, and access to wetlands have
also been linked to exchange anomalies.124 Accordingly, when compliance with a
123

See, e.g., W.R. Dubourg et al., Imprecise Preferences and the WTP-WTA
Disparity, 9 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 115, 118–22 (1994) (WTA-WTP gaps found with
respect to an auto-safety feature); Timothy L. McDaniels, Reference Points, Loss Aversion,
and Contingent Values for Auto Safety, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 187, 196–98 (1992)
(finding valuation gaps for auto safety feature); Shogren et al., supra note 90, at 259
(finding exchange anomalies with respect to food-borne pathogens).
124
See HAMMACK & BROWN, JR., supra note 76, at 27; W.D. SCHULZE ET AL., A CASE
STUDY OF A HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND
PSYCHOLOGY, at 8-3 to 8-4 (1986); Rowe et al., supra note 15, at 1–3, 18; Schulze et al.,
supra note 77. See generally Sayman & Öncüler, supra note 85 (investigating the effects of
certain factors related to study design and elicitation techniques on WTA-WTP gaps).
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law results in a cleaner street, cleaner air, or a less smoky work environment—as it
would in the case of antilittering ordinances, environmental regulations, and
workplace smoking bans, respectively—there is some reason to believe that the ex
post valuation of such goods would be higher than the ex ante valuation.
In some cases, legal compliance can lead to a new or enhanced reputation.
Businesses who comply with safety and environmental regulations, or engage in
“beyond compliance” behavior, are viewed in a positive light, patronized more
often, and insulated from various forms of public protest. 125 Similarly, individuals
who follow legal rules are seen as “law abiding citizens.” To the extent that
reputations can be seen as goods “owned” by individuals and firms, the
reputational benefits of compliance could conceivably be valued differently ex post
than they would have been ex ante (thus leading to path dependent compliance).
Importantly, the notion that reputation could be subject to something like an
endowment effect is speculative. Though I am not the first to suggest a possible
endowment effect for reputation, 126 no empirical study appears to have directly
addressed the issue. This Article includes this intriguing possibility because
individuals and businesses often treat reputation like a commodity, investing
significant resources in its maintenance and even selling it in certain
circumstances. Moreover, if intangible entitlements such as default contract terms,
intellectual property rights, and risk to self can be the basis for exchange
anomalies, the possibility of a similar effect in reputation seems at least
conceivable.
To be sure, legal compliance would not yield benefits, much less benefits that
would be subject to the endowment effect, in all cases. Compliance with antipiracy
laws that proscribe the downloading of copyrighted work from the Internet, for
example, would likely fall outside the purview of the endowment model. In this
context, compliance would be private, thus precluding any reputational benefits,
the value of which could conceivably be increased via the endowment effect. In
addition, no increases in safety or other tangible benefits would flow to those who
comply with this set of IP laws. For precisely the same reasons, compliance with
tax laws—another popular example in the literature on expressive law 127—would
likely not be explained by the endowment account. In both cases, compliance
entails direct costs without yielding any direct benefits on which the endowment
effect might operate. 128 In contexts similar to these, therefore, compliance is better
125

See Gunningham et al., supra note 35, at 309–10, 328–32.
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response
to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031, 1035 (2002) (“[E]ndowment effects could
make it meaningless to inquire into monetary valuations, particularly for items that are tied
to priceless goods such as reputation.”); Wendy J. Gordon & Sam Postbrief, On
Commodifying Intangibles, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 158 (1998) (book review)
(“[A]ssets such as reputation may have strong wealth or endowment effects . . . .”).
127
See, e.g., Morse, supra note 37 (defining an appropriate role for expressive law in
promoting tax compliance).
128
Of course, compliance in either case would ultimately yield societal benefits. In
the case of antipiracy laws, compliance might yield more (or better) artistic output in the
long run; more compliance with tax laws, further, would increase state and federal budgets
126
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explained by the continuing threat of sanction or some other expressive mechanism
(or both).
(b) How the Circumstances Surrounding Compliance Resemble Exchange
Experiments
As noted in the prior section, although governing bodies do not directly
reward legal compliance with mugs or chocolates, compliance often yields benefits
that fit comfortably within the large collection of goods featured in exchange
experiments. If ownership or entitlement alone triggered changes in value—as it
would under a strict reading of the endowment effect—any of the aforementioned
compliance benefits would presumably be valued more postcompliance than they
would precompliance. In other words, if the endowment effect exists as such, the
analysis begins and ends with the identification of a suitable good or
entitlement. 129
However, in light of the possibility that ownership alone does not change
preferences, it is worthwhile to consider the circumstances surrounding
compliance. Recall that several exchange experiments over the past decade have
failed to generate exchange anomalies. 130 In these experiments, the participants
were, in fact, endowed with goods. However, something about the experimental
context in which the goods were distributed prevented the appearance of WTAWTP gaps and/or exchange asymmetries. For example, no exchange anomalies are
observed in experiments with the following set of features:
(1) Random Distribution: the goods or endowments in question are
distributed among experimental subjects randomly (and participants
are told about the random nature of distribution);
(2) No Signals from Authority: the experimenters’ actions do not give
cues, express or implicit, about the value of the relevant goods;
(3) Anonymity: the trading choices of the experimental subjects are
private 131
According to authors of the “no-gap” studies, these null results do more than
suggest that the endowment effect is “context dependent.” 132 Rather, they question
whether ownership itself is really driving the exchange anomalies in the first

and allow for more beneficial social programs. However, in both cases, the benefits would
likely be too far removed from compliance and also too uncertain to give rise to the
compliance dynamic envisioned herein.
129
See Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 26 (noting the endowment effect gives
scholars “a license to assume, without explanation or argument, that virtually any
entitlement will positively affect preferences”).
130
See Isoni et al., supra note 105, at 992–93; Plott & Zeiler, Willingness to Pay,
supra note 102, at 540; Plott & Zeiler, supra note 74, at 1460.
131
See Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 37–40.
132
See id. at 42–46.
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instance—in other words, whether the endowment effect exists at all. 133 For the
purposes of the present inquiry, though, the existence of the endowment effect is
not of primary concern; it is a sufficient condition for the type of path-dependent
compliance envisioned here, but not a necessary one. The necessary condition is
the existence of the exchange anomalies that the endowment effect purportedly
explains. Accordingly, the important question is whether the circumstances
surrounding compliance in any given context are likely to lead to preference
changes across compliance states, however such preference changes might arise.
As it turns out, the context surrounding legal compliance largely resembles
the experimental conditions under which exchange anomalies are found. First,
compliance in many cases is not anonymous. Littering, smoking in nonsmoking
areas, disregarding workplace safety rules, and driving in violation of speed limits
and other vehicle safety laws, for example, are often publicly observable. Thus,
while experimental studies that cloak people’s choices in anonymity find no
exchange anomalies, compliance with legal rules—as it occurs in many real world
situations—does not always control for this factor. 134
Further, unlike the goods in the no-gap studies, compliance-related goods are
surrounded by social cues that signal their value. Benefits associated with legal
compliance are, by necessity, stamped with the imprimatur of the governing bodies
that pass the underlying laws. A law that forbids some unsafe behavior, for
example, signals something about the value of personal safety. Similarly, a law
that forbids an environmentally destructive activity provides a strong social cue
about the importance of the environment. 135 Just as subtle experimental signals
may lead to exchange anomalies in the case of coffee mugs, the social cues
associated with laws may lead compliers to value the benefits of compliance more
than they otherwise would: “Subjects compare not a mug and a pen, but a mug
given them by an authority figure with whom they might have future dealings, and
a pen whose choice might offend that authority.” 136
Indeed, the social cues surrounding legal compliance seem far stronger than
the subtle signals that appear to generate exchange anomalies in the experimental
context. In the context of experimental studies, the mere placement of a good in
front of a study participant or a repeated statement that clarifies the participants’
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See id.
Indeed, the transparency of compliance is a crucial part of social norms models,
where compliance is induced in part by the threat of social sanctions—if others can’t see it,
they can’t impose social sanctions on violators. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 33, at 599.
135
Again, there is a similarity here between the endowment model and other
expressive models such as those based on social meanings. The latter relies heavily on the
notion that the laws passed by the government have the normative force to change
meanings. See Lessig, supra note 4, at 946–47. In the endowment model, the same
normative force operates, but not on social meanings; rather, the law indirectly imbues
value into compliance-related benefits, thus generating exchange anomalies.
136
Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 44.
134

356

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

ownership of a good may determine whether exchange anomalies arise. 137 With
legal rules, the social cues are direct, clear, and backed by the authority of the
state. 138
Another important feature of the no-gap experiments is the random nature in
which the relevant goods are distributed. In these experiments, researchers take
pains to emphasize that the initial distribution of goods among the study
participants is not meaningful or motivated in any way by the characteristics of the
participants. 139 Unlike the goods in the no-gap experiments, however, compliancerelated benefits are distributed in a decidedly nonrandom fashion. To wit, they are
bestowed only on those who consciously choose to cooperate or adhere to the
relevant legal rule. This aspect of compliance benefits—the fact that they are, in a
sense, earned—not only militates toward the presence of exchange anomalies, but
also suggests that they may be large. As mentioned above, a number of studies
have suggested that WTA-WTP gaps tend to be bigger when individuals view the
relevant goods as being earned. 140 Of course, the larger the difference between ex
ante and ex post valuations of compliance-related benefits, the more likely that the
changes in preference, rather than external sanctions, will drive long-term
compliance.
In sum, while the no-gap experiments raise important questions about the
endowment effect itself, they do not foreclose the possibility that compliancerelated benefits may be valued differently across compliance states. In order to
definitively determine whether exchange anomalies would appear in any particular
compliance context, of course, a more detailed analysis (and perhaps experimental
work) would be required. The more modest goal of this Article is to show that, in
several cases, there are good reasons to believe that compliance, once initially
induced, could become sticky in the long run.
III. IMPLICATIONS, DISTINCTIONS, AND EXAMPLES
A. Disentangling the Endowment Account from Other Models
The expressive model presented above is about the stickiness, or pathdependence, of compliance: once a party complies with a legal rule, the benefits
associated with compliance may become more valuable, thus crowding out the
direct costs of compliance and making formal enforcement less relevant as a
motivating force. The extent to which the endowment model explains compliance
would, of course, vary according to the number and type of benefits associated
137

Among the cues that purportedly impact the valuation of goods in the experimental
context are statements to the participants: ‘“The mug is yours. I’m giving it to you. You
own it.”’ Id. at 40.
138
The ability of legal rules to signal something about the (otherwise unclear) value
of compliance-related benefits is an additional reason to characterize the endowment model
as a species of expressive law.
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See Klass & Zeiler, supra note 13, at 37–40.
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See Korobkin, supra note 11, at 1236; Loewenstein & Issacharoff, supra note 93,
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with compliance in any particular case. Where the endowment effect applies to a
large number of compliance-related benefits or operates on some subset of them
intensely, internalization is more likely to occur. Legal rules that do not yield the
types of compliance-related benefits listed above, conversely, would not become
internalized via the endowment effect.
This Article has suggested a few compliance domains in which the
endowment model is most likely to apply: (1) situations in which compliance with
a legal rule is transparent or readily observable by others (thus yielding a
reputational benefit); (2) situations where compliance with a rule reduces risk of
harm not only to third parties, but also to the actor making the compliance
decision; and (3) cases in which compliance endows compliers with an improved
environment, as it would, for example, in the case of antilittering ordinances and
workplace smoking bans. In all of the above cases, compliers stand to receive
specific rewards that are conceptually distinct from the mere “benefit” of avoiding
a sanction.
The criteria above give some hints about where the endowment model might
apply, but (even in such contexts) how can it be identified and disentangled from
other possible explanations of compliance? In short, how would we know it when
we see it? This identification problem is common among expressive theories, as
the underlying mechanisms—changed social meanings, norm cascades, updated
beliefs, and altered preferences—are not easily observable. As a result, expressive
aspects of law are usually identified through a process of elimination. First, to rule
out the possibility that external sanctions are driving compliance, expressive law
scholars typically look for instances of high compliance coupled with low (or
nonexistent) levels of formal enforcement.141 Once high compliance/low enforcement contexts are identified, other nonexpressive motivations for compliance must
be ruled out. For example, high levels of compliance may be observed in low
enforcement areas if the individuals subject to the law in question are under the
mistaken impression that the expected sanctions costs are high. Finally, once the
perceived threat of sanction is effectively ruled out as an explanation for
compliance, proponents of particular expressive models must rule out competing
expressive explanations.
The compliance dynamic suggested by the endowment model would be
particularly difficult to observe in light of the (initial, temporary) role that external
sanctions play in the compliance story. Because some initial threat of sanction is
necessary to induce compliance, endow compliers with some form of benefit, and
lead to changed preferences, the effects of the model would only be clear in
situations where the perceived threat of sanction drops substantially after some
initial period. Without the initial threat of external sanctions, the endowment
model would not apply at all; with continuing sanctions, though, it would be
difficult to know whether long-term compliance was a result of changed
preferences or the external sanctions themselves. Even in the rare case that fits the
above criteria, moreover, other expressive mechanisms would have to be ruled out
141

See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 19, at 4 (asking whether “law [can] change behavior
without deterring anyone”).
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as explanations of compliance. The list below summarizes the cases in which the
endowment model would be most clearly identifiable:
(1) Compliance with a legal rule would yield direct benefits to
compliers;
(2) Noncompliance would initially be subject to some external sanction,
real or perceived;
(3) The perceived threat of sanction drops (either because enforcement
efforts recede or because individuals subject to the law believe there
is a drop in the likelihood or severity of sanction); and
(4) Some other aspect of compliance, such as the timing, rules out other
expressive mechanisms as a possible motivation.
The next section explores a unique compliance domain that appears to fit the
above criteria: antismoking laws. Though compliance in this set of smoking
examples is likely a result of many overlapping factors, certain aspects of the story
are suggestive of the endowment model.
B. Smoking Bans—The Endowment Model in Action?
The past two decades have seen a dramatic rise in antismoking legislation.
Aiming to reduce public exposure to second-hand smoke, various governments
have prohibited smoking in the workplace, hospitality venues (such as hotels,
restaurants, and bars), and other public areas. In the United States, for example,
twenty-four states and Washington, D.C., have implemented some type of major
ban on smoking in shared public spaces. 142 Thousands of American cities, further,
have adopted local ordinances that broaden the reach of their respective state-level
laws. 143 Perhaps surprisingly, this legislative trend extends beyond our borders:
countries such as Ireland, Scotland, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, Norway,
and Italy have followed suit, implementing similar (and sometimes more
aggressive) smoking bans. 144 As noted by one commentator, “in a relatively short
time . . . cigarette smoking has become the most rigorously defined of all public
behaviors.” 145
While the precise contours of the various smoking bans differ as widely as the
populations they cover, the circumstances surrounding their passage share some
important features. Taken together, these commonalities appear to tell a story in
which short-term compliance with the bans is induced by the perceived threat of
sanction, while long-term compliance is induced by (among other things) a change
142

AM. NONSMOKER’S RIGHTS FOUND., OVERVIEW LIST—HOW MANY SMOKE-FREE
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in preferences about smoke-free environments. If this reading is correct, the
endowment model presented above may help to explain the uniform success
achieved by antismoking laws across the world.
As discussed in the previous section, situations in which high compliance is
achieved with minimal enforcement are often viewed as prima facie evidence of
the expressive power of law. 146 Antismoking laws appear to exhibit both of these
characteristics. Indeed, one of the more striking aspects of antismoking laws is the
uniformly high levels of compliance associated with them. 147 Shortly after the
implementation of Boston’s Clean Air Works Workplace Smoking Restrictions, 148
for example, a pair of studies showed nearly universal compliance. 149 California’s
experiences were similar: in the wake of the California Smoke-Free Workplace
Law, 150 smoking rates in Los Angeles County bars dropped abruptly from 55% to
under 25% for freestanding bars and from 7.8% to 1.5% in bar/restaurant
combinations. 151 Even after several years, compliance rates in California remained
high. 152 Delaware and New York also achieved high levels of compliance in the
immediate aftermath of their respective bans. 153 Studies of smoking bans in New
146
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Zealand, 154 Ireland, 155 Scotland, 156 and a number of other United States cities 157
echo these results, showing strikingly high levels of compliance.
The high compliance levels achieved in the wake of the antismoking laws are
particularly impressive given the seemingly modest sanctions attached to
noncompliance. Boston’s smoking ban, for example, carries a first-time penalty of
$200 and a second-time penalty of $700—relatively small fines for a business. 158
Violators of California’s law are subject to fines of $100 for initial violations and
up to $500 for subsequent violations. 159 Similarly, under Delaware law,
noncompliance is penalized to the tune of “$100.00 for the first violation and not
view/mmwrhtml/mm5344a3.htm (examining air quality in twenty-two western New York
hospitality venues and finding “on average, levels of respirable suspended particles (RSPs),
an accepted marker for [second hand smoke], decreased 84% in these venues after the law
took effect”).
154
See generally Nick Wilson et al., National Smokefree Law in New Zealand
Improves Air Quality Inside Bars, Pubs and Restaurants, 7 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 85
(2007) (examining air quality and smoking behavior in New Zealand pubs, restaurants, and
bars and finding 100% compliance with smoking ban within defined observation period,
though outside of the defined observation period of the study, one person was observed
smoking in a rural pub).
155
See, e.g., Geoffrey T. Fong et al., Reductions in Tobacco Smoke Pollution and
Increases in Support for Smoke‐Free Public Places Following the Implementation of
Comprehensive Smoke‐Free Workplace Legislation in the Republic of Ireland: Findings
from the ITC Ireland/UK Survey, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL iii51, iii51 (2006) (finding
“dramatic declines” in smoking in public places after comprehensive ban on smoking in
Ireland).
156
See Sean Semple et al., Secondhand Smoke Levels in Scottish Pubs: The Effect of
Smoke-Free Legislation, 16 TOBACCO CONTROL 127, 127 (2007) (finding “a marked
reduction in indoor particle levels . . . after the ban on smoking in a sample of pubs in
Scotland”).
157
Mark D. Eisner et al., Bartenders’ Respiratory Health After Establishment of
Smoke-Free Bars and Taverns, 280 JAMA 1909, 1909, 1913 (1998) (finding a dramatic
postban decrease in workplace smoke exposure for San Francisco bartenders); Ellen J.
Hahn et al., Effects of a Smoke-Free Law on Hair Nicotine and Respiratory Symptoms of
Restaurant and Bar Workers, 48 J. OCCUP. & ENVTL. MED. 906, 906, 909–11 (2006)
(examining nicotine exposure among bar workers in Lexington, Kentucky, and finding a
substantial postban decrease in hair nicotine and respiratory symptoms); Kiyoung Lee et
al., Immediate Impact of Smoke-Free Laws on Indoor Air Quality, 100 S. MED. J. 885, 887
(2007) (comparing preban and postban indoor air quality of hospitality venues in
Georgetown, Kentucky, and finding that “[i]ndoor fine particle pollution levels had
decreased 79% in the nine public venues one week after implementation of the smoke-free
law in Georgetown”); Wayne Ott et al., Particle Concentrations Inside a Tavern Before
and After Prohibition of Smoking: Evaluating the Performance of an Indoor Air Quality
Model, 46 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 1120, 1120, 1132 (1996) (finding a 90%
decrease in ambient smoke in Menlo Park, California, bar after smoke-free law passed).
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less than $250.00 for each subsequent violation.” 160 Further, given the large
number of venues subject to the smoking bans and the limited resources of the
entities responsible for enforcement, the likelihood of detection would also appear,
at least in retrospect, to be low.
For these reasons, scholars interested in social norms and expressive law have
seized upon antismoking laws as a paradigmatic case. Proponents of “social
meaning” accounts of expressive law, for example, explain compliance with
smoking bans by reference to an interpretive shift regarding the act of smoking. 161
Under this account, the enactment of a smoking ban alters the web of associations
surrounding smoking—from glamorous, cool, or rebellious to harmful, impolite,
dirty, and disruptive. 162
Another strand of norms scholarship suggests that smoking bans signal
consensus views regarding smoking in certain social contexts. The logic of these
accounts is roughly as follows: if a smoking law is passed by a legislative body,
members of which are directly accountable to the public, then a majority of the
relevant population must believe that smoking is bad. If, further, a majority of the
population supports antismoking legislation, then they will seek to uphold it. 163
Even if formal enforcement of antismoking laws is weak or nonexistent, the
possibility of informal shaming—dirty looks, complaints, and personal
confrontations—may induce high levels of compliance. The consensus signal
would presumably be strong in the case of antismoking laws, where only a clear
majority view could manage to overcome the organized tobacco interests that
would thwart such legislation. 164
Just as the antismoking laws might change the social meaning of smoking or
signal consensus views about it, the laws might also change individual beliefs
about the (nonsocial) consequences of smoking and exposure to second-hand
smoke. 165 The enactment of a smoking ban, more specifically, might lead
individuals to update the substance or certainty of their views on the dangers of
smoking or second-hand smoke.
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All of the expressive mechanisms described above—informational, socialmeanings accounts and those based on norms—are plausible as a general matter
and likely played some role in the smoking cases. None of them, however, appear
to explain the precise timing of compliance in this particular context. In the case of
smoking bans, compliance can be tracked precisely by observational studies and
sophisticated air quality analyses. In the former, researchers observe smoking
behavior directly, count cigarette butts, and even observe the number of ashtrays
available in the hospitality venues subject to the smoking bans. 166 Air quality
studies, as their name suggests, take precise measurements of the environment in
hospitality venues before and shortly after enforcement of smoking bans.
Both types of studies suggest that compliance with the smoking bans
increased dramatically at the precise juncture when enforcement began—not when
the relevant laws were formally adopted. New York City, for example, passed its
smoking ban on March 26, 2003. 167 After much fanfare, both positive and
negative, 168 New York State began enforcing the law four months later on July 24,
2003. 169 The results of two separate studies, however, suggest that people remained
noncompliant until the precise moment when enforcement began. 170
The compliance dynamic observed in New York appears to be typical of
smoking bans. The California Smoke-Free Workplace Law took effect on January
1, 1995, prohibiting smoking in most workplaces. 171 But the ban only became
enforceable in bars on January 1, 1998. 172 As in New York, the upward spike in
compliance coincided precisely with the enforcement period for bars, some three
years after the passage of the underlying statute.173 Boston’s Smoke Free Law was
enacted in December 2002 but only became enforceable in May of the following
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See, e.g., Skeer et al., supra note 149; Weber et al., supra note 151, at 269–72.
See Winnie Hu, New York State Adopts Strict Ban on Workplace Smoking, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at D1.
168
See, e.g., Winnie Hu & Ann Farmer, Ban on Smoking in the Workplace Draws
Little Protest at a Senate Committee Vote in Albany, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2003), http://w
ww.nytimes.com/2003/03/26/nyregion/ban-smoking-workplace-draws-little-protest-senatecommittee-vote-albany.html; Winnie Hu, The Smoking Ban: Clear Air, Murky Economics,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/28/nyregion/the -smokingban-clear-air-murky-economics.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Kenneth Lovett, Bars Plan
to Draw Out Smoke-Ban Protest, N.Y. POST (June, 10, 2003, 4:00 AM), http://ny
post.com/2003/06/10/bars-plan-to-draw-out-smoke-ban-protest/.
169
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-n (McKinney 2003).
170
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preenforcement period to two months after).
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year. 174 Again, two studies of air quality—one in which the “before” and “after”
air quality measurements straddled the beginning of the enforcement period by a
mere week on either side—suggest a dramatic upward tick in compliance right as
enforcement began. 175 Studies from other United States and foreign cities indicate
a similar compliance timeline. 176
The initial timing of compliance in these cases appears to rule out competing
expressive explanations. For example, under informational accounts, compliance
would be attributed to updated beliefs about the dangers of smoking and secondhand smoke. 177 But the smoking bans mentioned above were all formally passed
several months (or years) before the respective enforcement periods began.
Moreover, during the interim period between formal adoption and enforcement,
many of the bans were highly publicized in the press and through government-led
educational campaigns. 178 In light of the significant lag periods and the publicity of
the laws, it seems unlikely that any belief change about the effects of smoking
would only occur at the exact moment of enforcement and not before.
For similar reasons, expressive accounts based on social meanings or
consensus signals fail to explain compliance in this case. With regard to the
former, if the passage of a law changed the social meaning of smoking in shared
public spaces, why would smoking continue until the enforcement period?
Presumably, any normative force associated with the law would be established
through the formal adoption itself, rather than its enforcement. Similarly, if
compliance were driven by the fear of informal sanctions from the nonsmoking
174

Boston Public Health Commission Regulation: Clean Air Works Workplace
Smoking and E-Cigarette Use Restrictions, BOS. PUB. HEALTH COMM’N (Dec. 1, 2011),
http://www.bphc.org/whatwedo/tobacco-free-living/Documents/Amended_Clean_Air_Wor
ks_Workplace_E_Cigarette_Restrictions_Regulation.pdf; Stephen Smith & Jenny Jiang,
City Bans Smoking in Bars, Eateries, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2002, at B1.
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majority, one would expect compliance to coincide with the majority signal itself:
again, formal adoption of the smoking bans. After all, once the bans were passed,
nonsmokers immediately would be empowered by their majority numbers to
confront noncomplying members of the minority group.
In light of the above, the most likely explanation for the dramatic, initial
uptick in compliance is the simplest one: those subject to the smoking bans
initially complied to avoid formal sanctions. More specifically, they (the bar
owners and patrons) complied in the face of an uncertain level of enforcement.
Though the penalties associated with noncompliance are typically quite low on a
“per violation” basis, nobody subject to the law could have known, ex ante, how
aggressively the laws would be enforced. The significant uproar from bar and
restaurant owners before the passage of the smoking bans and during the
preenforcement interim period, however, betrays a widespread belief that
noncompliance would be routinely penalized. 179 In short, bar owners believed ex
ante that the expected sanction for noncompliance would be nontrivial.
In several cases, however, it became an open secret that noncompliance was
unlikely to be detected and/or sanctioned. News articles quickly deemed the bans
“toothless,” and in some cases, the governing bodies themselves admitted as
much. 180 If bar owners acted in an economically rational manner, therefore, one
would expect a return to noncompliance. However, compliance with smoking bans
has generally persisted over the long run. 181 Given the low likelihood of
detection—and, in turn, the abrupt drop in the expected sanction for
noncompliance—what explains compliance with smoking bans over time?
An extensive collection of survey research suggests that changed preferences
likely played a role in long-term compliance. The overriding theme of this
literature is that support for smoking policies increases after the implementation of
bans. 182 Considered in isolation, postban increases in support for smoking bans
179
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180
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could be taken as evidence for any number of expressive theories. However, as
stated above, the timing of compliance in these cases coupled with the
preenforcement awareness and publicity of the various bans suggests that at least
some of the increased support was driven by changes in preference. The authors of
two separate studies on support for smoking bans concluded along these lines.
According to one, “[O]nce people understand the rationale for implementing
smoke-free policies and experience their benefits, public support increases even
among smokers, and compliance with smoke-free regulations increases over
time.” 183Another study concluded similarly: “smoke-free legislation seems to have
the potential to change attitudes, and acceptance increases once smokers
experience the legislation and its benefits.” 184
Other studies support the endowment model more specifically. Whereas the
above studies identify (postban) increases in general support for smoke-free laws,
other surveys specifically frame the analysis in terms of individual preferences or
the value of smoke-free environments. A study of bar owners and staff in
California, for example, found a three-fold increase in those who “prefer to work
in a smoke-free environment” from 1998 to 2002 (the year enforcement began). 185
A similar study by the same author examined changes in the attitudes of patrons in
response to smoking bans. 186 Among the questions asked in the latter study was the
following: “How important is it to you to have a smoke-free environment inside
bars?” 187 Though survey respondents were not asked to give their answers in dollar
amounts, the foregoing question can be fairly interpreted as a question about the
economic value of smoke-free environments. And, as the study showed, the value
of smoke-free environments appeared to follow an upward trajectory among bar
patrons after the implementation of the law. 188
Yet another study—this time of Irish citizens—found significant increases in
postlegislation support for the notion that “[s]moke-free bars . . . [are] more
comfortable to visit.” 189 The increase in support was significant: “[b]efore the
legislation three-quarters of the participants agreed that the ban would make bars
more comfortable and was needed to protect workers’ health. Post-legislation the
proportion increased to over 90%.” 190
183
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This patchwork of evidence—a conglomeration of different types of studies
over different geographic areas and time periods—falls short of definitive proof of
the endowment model. However, when examined as a whole, the evidence tells a
story that is supportive of the endowment model. Once endowed with the various
benefits of a smoke-free work environment, it appears that bar owners, employees,
and patrons valued those benefits more and continued to comply.
The possibility that exchange anomalies, or changes in the valuation of
smoke-free environments, explains long-term compliance in the context of
smoking bans, of course, does not entirely rule out other explanations. It remains
entirely plausible, for example, that long-term compliance is partially attributable
to the fact that smoking bans were not ultimately as detrimental to business as bar
owners had anticipated. Under this reading, postban changes in support for the
laws would simply be the result of updated views. However, it is not entirely clear
that the initial opposition to the bans was motivated exclusively by profits, nor is it
clear that bar owners were convinced ex post that the smoking bans were not
harmful to business. 191 Perhaps more importantly, this financial explanation does
not explain why bar owners, employees, and patrons alike valued smoke-free
environments more after the bans became enforceable.192 In any case, whether this
profit-based explanation for long-term compliance is correct, it is not necessarily
incompatible with the endowment model. Compliance could, in other words, be
explained by both accounts (as it could by a combination of the endowment model
and any of the other expressive theories described herein).
IV. CONCLUSION
The endowment account is something of a middle ground between strict
economic approaches to compliance and other expressive models. Whereas the
former relies exclusively on the role of formal sanctions, the latter often
underplays their role. Economic models, moreover, assume that individual
preferences are static and paramount to the compliance decision, while their
expressive counterparts paint preferences as profoundly fluid. Under the
endowment account, external sanctions do play a vital role, but individual
preferences are not assumed to be static over time. Compliance is induced initially
by sanctions, but sustained by changes in preference.
If the endowment model accurately captures something about the nature of
compliance, the insights offered in this Article can help policy makers deploy
enforcement resources in a way that maximizes compliance. One practical
implication of the model is that, in circumstances where compliance yields distinct
benefits, only a temporary period of enforcement may be required. To achieve the
greatest bang for one’s enforcement buck, that is, the endowment model suggests
that the “frontloading” of enforcement—aggressive monitoring in the immediate
191
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wake of passage, followed by a gradual decline in enforcement efforts—would be
optimal in some cases.
Another implication of the endowment model concerns the framing of laws.
Though compliance with many laws yields distinct benefits, most people think of
laws as burdensome and costly. To the extent that governments can emphasize the
benefits of complying with laws, rather than just the negative consequences of
noncompliance, any preference change with respect to compliance benefits might
be magnified. In this sense, a government’s emphasis on the benefits of
compliance would be tantamount to a researcher in an exchange experiment telling
a participant, “The mug is yours. I’m giving it to you. You own it.” 193 Laws could
be pitched in the same way: “The clean air (or decreased risk of harm or other
compliance-related benefit) is yours. We’re giving it to you. If you comply, you
will own it.” Of course, further research would be required to determine with any
confidence where the endowment model might apply—where, in other words,
“sticks” can become “carrots.”
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